מלחמת יום הכיפורים – הבדלי גרסאות

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שורה 688:
 
== הערות שוליים ==
{{reflist|2|refs= {{הערה|שם=Quandt2005p114bQuandt2005p109|1={{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=114109-112|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|pages=112109|quote="Thebetween UOctober 9 and October 12.S..the influenceAmerican withresponse...call kingfor Husseincease-fire..in hadplace...arms helpedfor keepIsrael Jordanbegan outto offlow thein war.modest quantities"}}}}
{{reflist|2|refs=
{{הערה|שם=Quandt2005p109Quandt2005p112|1={{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=109-112|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|pages=109112|quote="betweenNixon Octoberand 9Kissinger andheld Octoberback 12on a full scale...the Americanresupply responseeffort...callshort forof cease-fire..insupplies, place...armsthe forIsraeli Israelgovernment beganreluctantly toaccepted flowa cease-fire in modestplace on October 12...but...Sadat quantitiesrefused"}}}}
{{הערה|שם=Quandt2005p114|1={{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=114|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|pages=112|quote="Soviet arms must not be allowed to dictate the outcome of the fighting...Israeli success on the battlefield had become an important factor in persuading the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end....with an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until ...realities on the battlefield led to a change of Egyptian and soviet calculations"}}}}
{{הערה|שם=Quandt2005p116Quandt2005p114b|1={{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=116114|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|pages=112|quote="itThe was of prime importance that the fighting should be endedU.S..when all parties could still emerge from the conflictinfluence with theirking vitalHussein interestshad andhelped selfkeep esteemJordan intact..the airlift...the Soviets must see that the united states could deliver more than they could; p. 123 the U.S would not permit the destructionout of the 3rd army corpswar."}}}}
 
{{הערה|שם=Quandt2005p112Quandt2005p116|1={{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=109-112116|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|pages=112|quote="Nixonit andwas Kissingerof heldprime backimportance onthat athe fullfighting scale...resupplyshould effortbe ended...shortwhen ofall supplies,parties thecould Israelistill governmentemerge reluctantlyfrom acceptedthe aconflict cease-firewith intheir placevital oninterests Octoberand 12self esteem intact..the airlift.but..the Soviets must see that the united states could deliver more than they could; p.Sadat refused123 the U.S would not permit the destruction of the 3rd army corps."}}}}
 
{{הערה|שם=Quandt2005p114|1={{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=114|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|pages=112|quote="Soviet arms must not be allowed to dictate the outcome of the fighting...Israeli success on the battlefield had become an important factor in persuading the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end....with an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until ...realities on the battlefield led to a change of Egyptian and soviet calculations"}}}}
 
{{הערה|שם=Quandt2005p114b|1={{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=114|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|pages=112|quote="The U.S. influence with king Hussein had helped keep Jordan out of the war."}}}}
 
 
{{הערה|שם=Quandt2005p116|1={{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=116|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|pages=112|quote="it was of prime importance that the fighting should be ended...when all parties could still emerge from the conflict with their vital interests and self esteem intact..the airlift...the Soviets must see that the united states could deliver more than they could; p. 123 the U.S would not permit the destruction of the 3rd army corps."}}}}
 
}}