משתמש:אגלי טל/אוריגינליזם


אוריגינליזם, (אנגלית: Originalism. מבוטא בשפת המקור: אוריג'ינליזם) היא גישה משפטית בהקשר של הפרשנות החוקתית של ארצות הברית, הגורסת כי יש לפרש את משמעות החוקה כיציבה מתקופת חקיקתה. על פי גישה זו, הדרך ליצור שינויים והתאמות בחוקה היא רק על ידי הצעדים החקיקתיים שנקבעו בסעיף 5 לחוקה (הכוללים אישור ברוב מיוחס בקונגרס וכן אישור ברוב מיוחס של בתי הקונגרס המדינתיים). המצדדים בעמדה זו שוללים אפשרות של יצירת שינוי במשמעות החוקה באמצעות פרשנות מרחיבה המותאמת לתפיסות עדכניות. מקור המונח בשנות ה-80.

כיום פופולרית הגישה האוריגינליסטית בקרב חלקים בזרם השמרני בארצות הברית, והיא מזוהה באופן הבולט ביותר עם שופטי בית המשפט העליון של ארצות הברית קלרנס תומאס וניל גורסץ', ועם מי שכיהן בו בעבר, השופט אנטונין סקאליה, והמשפטן רוברט בורק המנוחים. עם זאת, גם משפטנים ליברלים מובהקים, כמו השופט הוגו בלאק והמשפטן אקהיל אמר(אנ'), היו שותפים לתאוריה. [1]

הגדרהעריכה

אוריגנליזם הוא מונח-על לשיטות פרשניות המקיימות את "תזה הקיבוע", כלומר, את הרעיון שתוכן סמנטי של התבטאות נקבע בזמן שהוא נמסר. אוריגינליסטים מחפשים אחד משני מקורות חלופיים לצורך הבנת משמעות חוק או סעיף בחוקה:

  • תאוריית המשמעות המקורית, הקשורה קשר הדוק לטקסטואליזם, היא ההשקפה לפיה פרשנות של חוקה או חוק כתוב צריכה להתבסס על האופן שבו אנשים הגיוניים שחיו בזמן האימוץ של הטקסט היו מבינים את משמעותו הפשוטה. רוב האוריגינליסטים, כמו השופט סקאליה, מזוהים עם השקפה זו.
  • תאוריית הכוונה המקורית, הגורסת כי פרשנות של חוקה כתובה היא (או צריכה להיות) בהתאם לכוונתם של אלה שגיבשו ואישררו אותה. זוהי תפיסת מיעוט בקרב האוריגינליסטים כיום.

תאוריות אלה חולקות את ההשקפה לפיה ישנה כוונה מקורית או משמעות מקורית מעת אישורה של חוקה או חוק, הניתנת לזיהוי, ושאמורה להכתיב את פרשנותה גם לעתיד. הוויכוח בין התאוריות מתמקד בשאלה איזו כוונה או משמעות מקורית צריכה לשמש כמדד לפרשנות: כוונות המחברים והמאשרים, המשמעות המקורית של הטקסט בעיני מתבונן הגיוני באותו הזמן, שילוב של השניים או המשמעות המקורית של הטקסט אך לא היישום הצפוי שלו[דרושה הבהרה].

____________

In the context of United States constitutional interpretation, originalism is a way to interpret the Constitution's meaning as stable from the time of enactment, which can be changed only by the steps set out in Article Five.[1] The term originated in the 1980s.[2]

Today, originalism is popular among some political conservatives in the U.S., and it is most prominently associated with Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Neil Gorsuch, the late Justice Antonin Scalia, and the late Judge Robert Bork. However, some liberals, such as late Justice Hugo Black and jurist Akhil Amar, have also subscribed to the theory.[3]

Originalism is an umbrella term for interpretative methods that hold to the "fixation thesis," the notion that an utterance's semantic content is fixed at the time it is uttered.[4] Originalists seek one of two alternative sources of meaning:

The original intent theory, which holds that interpretation of a written constitution is (or should be) consistent with what was meant by those who drafted and ratified it. That is currently a minority view among originalists. The original meaning theory, which is closely related to textualism, is the view that interpretation of a written constitution or law should be based on what reasonable persons living at the time of its adoption would have understood the ordinary meaning of the text to be. Most originalists, such as Justice Scalia, are associated with that view. Such theories share the view that there is an identifiable original intent or original meaning, contemporaneous with the ratification of a constitution or statute, which should govern its subsequent interpretation. The divisions between the theories relate to what exactly that identifiable original intent or original meaning is: the intentions of the authors or the ratifiers, the original meaning of the text, a combination of the two, or the original meaning of the text but not its expected application.

Strict constructionismעריכה

תבנית:Refimprove section Bret Boyce described the origins of the term originalist as follows: The term "originalism" has been most commonly used since the middle 1980s and was apparently coined by Paul Brest in The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding.[2] It is often asserted that originalism is synonymous with strict constructionism.[3][4][5][6]

 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was a firm believer in originalism

Both theories are associated with textualist and formalist schools of thought, however there are pronounced differences between them. Justice Scalia differentiated the two by pointing out that, unlike an originalist, a strict constructionist would not acknowledge that he uses a cane means he walks with a cane (because, strictly speaking, this is not what he uses a cane means).[7] Scalia averred that he was "not a strict constructionist, and no-one ought to be"; he goes further, calling strict constructionism "a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute".[8]

Originalism is a theory of interpretation, not construction.[9] However, this distinction between "interpretation" and "construction" is controversial and is rejected by many nonoriginalists as artificial. As Scalia said, "the Constitution, or any text, should be interpreted [n]either strictly [n]or sloppily; it should be interpreted reasonably"; once originalism has told a Judge what the provision of the Constitution means, they are bound by that meaning—however the business of Judging is not simply to know what the text means (interpretation), but to take the law's necessarily general provisions and apply them to the specifics of a given case or controversy (construction). In many cases, the meaning might be so specific that no discretion is permissible, but in many cases, it is still before the Judge to say what a reasonable interpretation might be. A judge could, therefore, be both an originalist and a strict constructionist—but he is not one by virtue of being the other.

To put the difference more explicitly, both schools take the plain meaning of the text as their starting point, but have different approaches that can best be illustrated with a fictitious example.

Suppose that the Constitution contained (which it obviously does not) a provision that a person may not be "subjected to the punishments of hanging by the neck, beheading, stoning, pressing, or execution by firing squad". A strict constructionist might interpret that clause to mean that the specific punishments mentioned above were unconstitutional, but that other forms of capital punishment were permissible. For a strict constructionist, the specific, strict reading of the text is the beginning and end of the inquiry.

For an originalist, however, the text is the beginning of the inquiry, and two originalists might reach very different results, not only from the strict constructionist, but from each other. "Originalists can reach different results in the same case" (see What originalism is not—originalism is not always an answer in and of itself, below); one originalist might look at the context in which the clause was written, and might discover that the punishments listed in the clause were the only forms of capital punishment in use at that time, and the only forms of capital punishment that had ever been used at the time of ratification. An originalist might therefore conclude that capital punishment in general, including those methods for it invented since ratification, such as the electric chair, are not constitutional. Another originalist may look at the text and see that the writers created a list. He would assume that the authors intended this to be an exhaustive list of objectionable executions. Otherwise, they would have banned capital punishment as a whole, instead of listing specific means of punishment. He would rule that other forms of execution are constitutional.

Note that originalists would agree that, if the original meaning of the text could be ascertained, that meaning governs. Where they disagree, as in this example, is about exactly how to find that meaning. For example, any originalist or even a strict constructionist might apply the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which presumes that when an author includes one example he intends to exclude others. If that canon is appropriate in the example here, all originalist interpreters would likely reach the same result. Contrast this with a "living constitutional" interpretation, which might find that, although the text itself only prohibits certain methods, those methods are examples of particularly unpleasant methods of execution; therefore, the text invites modern readers to extend its principle to those forms of punishment we now find particularly unpleasant.

בניה קפדניתעריכה

תבנית:Refimprove section ברט בויס תיאר את מקורות המושג 'אוריגינליזם' כדלקמן: המונח "מקוריות" נמצא בשימוש הנפוץ ביותר מאז אמצע שנות השמונים ונטבע כנראה על ידי פול ברסט ב החיפוש המוטעה אחר המקור הבנת [שם נרדף = "בויס" /> לעיתים קרובות נטען כי "מקוריזם" הוא שם נרדף ל - "בנייה קפדנית . '[10] [11] [12] {{הערה| nathan hendler; doug floyd; john banks. [http: // www.weeklywire.com/ww/04-10-00/boston_feature_1.html "חדשות וחוות דעת: מי ימנה בוש לבית המשפט העליון? (04/01-00)"]. בדיקה אחרונה ב-$1 $2.  Unknown parameter |המחבר= ignored (עזרה); Missing |last1= in Authors list (עזרה); Check date values in: |accessdate= (עזרה)

 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was a firm believer in originalism

Both theories are associated with textualist and formalist schools of thought, however there are pronounced differences between them. Justice Scalia differentiated the two by pointing out that, unlike an originalist, a strict constructionist would not acknowledge that he uses a cane means he walks with a cane (because, strictly speaking, this is not what he uses a cane means).[13] Scalia averred that he was "not a strict constructionist, and no-one ought to be"; he goes further, calling strict constructionism "a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute".[14]

Originalism is a theory of interpretation, not construction.[15] However, this distinction between "interpretation" and "construction" is controversial and is rejected by many nonoriginalists as artificial. As Scalia said, "the Constitution, or any text, should be interpreted [n]either strictly [n]or sloppily; it should be interpreted reasonably"; once originalism has told a Judge what the provision of the Constitution means, they are bound by that meaning—however the business of Judging is not simply to know what the text means (interpretation), but to take the law's necessarily general provisions and apply them to the specifics of a given case or controversy (construction). In many cases, the meaning might be so specific that no discretion is permissible, but in many cases, it is still before the Judge to say what a reasonable interpretation might be. A judge could, therefore, be both an originalist and a strict constructionist—but he is not one by virtue of being the other.

To put the difference more explicitly, both schools take the plain meaning of the text as their starting point, but have different approaches that can best be illustrated with a fictitious example.

Suppose that the Constitution contained (which it obviously does not) a provision that a person may not be "subjected to the punishments of hanging by the neck, beheading, stoning, pressing, or execution by firing squad". A strict constructionist might interpret that clause to mean that the specific punishments mentioned above were unconstitutional, but that other forms of capital punishment were permissible. For a strict constructionist, the specific, strict reading of the text is the beginning and end of the inquiry.

For an originalist, however, the text is the beginning of the inquiry, and two originalists might reach very different results, not only from the strict constructionist, but from each other. "Originalists can reach different results in the same case" (see What originalism is not—originalism is not always an answer in and of itself, below); one originalist might look at the context in which the clause was written, and might discover that the punishments listed in the clause were the only forms of capital punishment in use at that time, and the only forms of capital punishment that had ever been used at the time of ratification. An originalist might therefore conclude that capital punishment in general, including those methods for it invented since ratification, such as the electric chair, are not constitutional. Another originalist may look at the text and see that the writers created a list. He would assume that the authors intended this to be an exhaustive list of objectionable executions. Otherwise, they would have banned capital punishment as a whole, instead of listing specific means of punishment. He would rule that other forms of execution are constitutional.

Note that originalists would agree that, if the original meaning of the text could be ascertained, that meaning governs. Where they disagree, as in this example, is about exactly how to find that meaning. For example, any originalist or even a strict constructionist might apply the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which presumes that when an author includes one example he intends to exclude others. If that canon is appropriate in the example here, all originalist interpreters would likely reach the same result. Contrast this with a "living constitutional" interpretation, which might find that, although the text itself only prohibits certain methods, those methods are examples of particularly unpleasant methods of execution; therefore, the text invites modern readers to extend its principle to those forms of punishment we now find particularly unpleasant.

(אנ')עריכה

  1. ^ הארנק והחרב, ידיעות ספרים, 2013
  2. ^ שגיאת ציטוט: תג <ref> לא תקין; לא נכתב טקסט עבור הערות השוליים בשם Boyce
  3. ^ The University of Chicago, The Law School "I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be."
  4. ^ "Archived copy". אורכב מ-המקור ב-December 19, 2005. בדיקה אחרונה ב-16 בדצמבר 2005. 
  5. ^ "Archived copy". אורכב מ-המקור ב-December 16, 2005. בדיקה אחרונה ב-16 בדצמבר 2005. 
  6. ^ wil gerken; nathan hendler; doug floyd; john banks. "News & Opinion: Who Would Bush Appoint to the Supreme Court? (The Boston Phoenix . 04-10-00)". בדיקה אחרונה ב-19 במרץ 2016. 
  7. ^ See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)
  8. ^ A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, ISBN 978-0-691-00400-6, Amy Guttman ed. 1997, at p.23.
  9. ^ Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause
  10. ^ [http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com "אני לא בנאי מחמיר, ואף אחד לא צריך להיות."
  11. ^ [https: //web.archive.org/web/20051219192336/http: // polazzo .stuysu.org / can_bush_deliver_a_conservative.htm "archive copy"]. אורכב מ-[http : //polazzo.stuysu.org/can_bush_deliver_a_conservative.htm המקור] ב-19 בדצמבר 2005. בדיקה אחרונה ב-16 בדצמבר 2005.  Unknown parameter |dururl= ignored (עזרה); Check date values in: |archivedate= (עזרה)
  12. ^ [https: //web.arc hive.org/web/20051216121611/http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/mentions.htm "Archived copydate = December 16, 2005"]. אורכב מ-[http: //jurist.law.pitt.edu/mentions.htm המקור] ב-16 בדצמבר 2005.  Unknown parameter |dururl= ignored (עזרה); Check date values in: |archivedate= (עזרה)
  13. ^ See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)
  14. ^ A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, ISBN 978-0-691-00400-6, Amy Guttman ed. 1997, at p.23.
  15. ^ Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause