ג'ימי קרטר – הבדלי גרסאות

קרטר הופתע מהפלישה, בעיקר מפני שהיא התרחשה שלא על דעת גורמי המודיעין. באותם ימים היה עסוק בעיקר במשבר באיראן.{{הערה|שם=Riedel|{{cite book|authorlink=Bruce Riedel|last=Riedel|first=Bruce|title=What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989|publisher=[[Brookings Institution]] Press|year=2014|isbn=978-0815725954|pp=ix-xi, 21–22, 93, 98–99, 105}}}} הפלישה נחשבה לאיום לביטחון העולמי ולאספקת הנפט מ[[המפרץ הפרסי]].{{הערה|שם=Kepel}} בנוסף עלה החשש שברית המועצות תפלוש גם אל איראן ופקיסטן. בז'ז'ינסקי ראה בנושא נושא בעל חשיבות עצומה.{{הערה|שם=Blight}}{{הערה|שם=Riedel}} הנושא היה חשוב בממשל קרטר ורייגן, והממשלים השקיעו רבות בניסיון לשפר את היחסים עם פקיסטן אל מול איראן.{{הערה|שם=Riedel}}{{הערה|שם=Gates|{{cite book|last=Gates|first=Bob|title=From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War|publisher=Simon and Schuster|year=2007|isbn=9781416543367|pp=145–147}} When asked whether he expected that the revelations in his memoir (combined with an apocryphal quote attributed to Brzezinski) would inspire "a mind-bending number of conspiracy theories which adamantly—and wrongly—accuse the Carter Administration of luring the Soviets into Afghanistan", Gates replied: "No, because there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily." See Gates, email communication with John Bernell White, Jr., October 15, 2011, as cited in {{cite web|last=White|first=John Bernell|url=http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4790&context=gradschool_theses|title=The Strategic Mind Of Zbigniew Brzezinski: How A Native Pole Used Afghanistan To Protect His Homeland|date=May 2012|accessdate=2017-10-10|pp=45–46, 82}}}}{{הערה|שם=Coll|{{cite book|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001|publisher=Penguin|year=2004|isbn=9781594200076|pp=87, 581|quote=Contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail.  ... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism.}}}}